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 Governance within the Navajo Nation
 Have Democratic Traditions Taken Hold?
 David Wilkins
 his essay crafts a description and analysis of the political and in-
 stitutional context, structures, and issues of the Navajo Nation's gov-
 ernment. We begin with a demographic, institutional, and ideological
 assessment of the nation as it currently stands, move to a historical
 overview of the nation from precontact times to the 1989 riots, and
 conclude with a short policy portfolio of three issues-land claims,
 gaming, and taxation-that will likely impact the shape and direction
 the nation will head into the twenty-first century.
 The Navajo Reservation is a vast, rugged, and beautiful land. First
 delineated in the 1868 treaty, it has nearly quadrupled in size since
 then through some twenty-five additions. Today, the Dine land base is g
 some 25,351 square miles (nearly 18 million acres), encompassing a .
 large portion of northeastern Arizona, a part of northwestern New
 Mexico, and some 1,900 square miles in southeastern Utah. Interest-
 ingly, the Navajo Nation also includes three satellite (geographically
 separate) Navajo communities-Canoncito, Alamo, and Ramah-all
 in western New Mexico-and completely encircles two other tribes, ~ 91
 the Hopi nation and the San Juan Paiute.
 The Navajo Reservation represents 36 percent of all Indian lands
 in the continental United States.' This tremendous stretch of land, the
 largest of the 278 Indian reservations in the country, is slightly larger .
 than the state of West Virginia. Nearly 15 million acres of Navajo trib-
 al land is held in trust2 by the federal government.
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 Preliminary analysis of the 2000 U.S. census data estimated that
 there are 250,000 Navajos living in the United States. Of this total, an
 estimated 180,000 live within the reservation proper (including the
 Eastern Navajo Checkerboard area). This population, the largest of
 any single tribe except for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, which
 now claims to have 369,035 members, has nearly doubled in the last
 twenty years and continues to grow at an astounding rate. About one-
 third of all Navajos living within the reservation are less than sixteen
 years old, and the median age is 18.8 years.
 Unlike many other reservations, which were allotted and opened
 for white homesteaders, allotment was never widely implemented on
 the Navajo Nation, and therefore the number of non-Indians and non-
 Navajo Indians remains quite small. According to the 1990 U.S. cen-
 sus, over 90 percent of the reservation population was Navajo. Although
 the Navajo population continues to grow rapidly, economic statistics
 are not nearly as encouraging. While per capita income for Anglo-
 Americans is $15,252, it is only $6,651 for Navajos. More than 56 per-
 cent of Navajos live below the poverty line, while only 15.7 percent of
 Arizonans are below that depressing threshold. The Navajo Nation in
 1996 had a total labor force of 50,857. However, the unemployment
 rate in that year was 44.61 percent. This figure usually fluctuates be-
 tween 38 and 50 percent depending on the season. Equally disheart-
 ening is the reality that while the total personal income of Navajos
 was over $1 billion for 1996, less than $300 million was actually spent
 within the reservation's borders, a leakage of over 76 percent to off-
 reservation communities who benefit from the purchasing power of
 Navajo shoppers.3
 Politically, Navajos have been fairly active in tribal elections. For
 example, more than 93,000 Navajos were registered to vote in 1998,
 although only 42 percent of the registered voters actually participated
 in the fall presidential primary. This low turnout appears to reflect the
 disenchantment many Navajos feel with the ethical problems of sever-
 al of their recent presidents.
 > Of the five agencies-Western Navajo, Chinle, Fort Defiance,
 Shiprock, and Eastern Navajo-Fort Defiance has the largest number
 V of registered voters: 24,569 as of 1998. There is also evidence that
 more Navajos participate in federal, state, and local elections when a
 candidate's stand on issues of importance to Navajos is evident.4 His-
 92 3 torically, Navajo voting patterns in tribal elections have been better
 than the voting percentages of Americans, whose turnout in American
 ? presidential elections ranks at the bottom of voting rates for twenty-
 seven countries with competitive elections. In 1992, for example, the
 non-Indian turnout rate for the presidential race was only 55 percent.
 This percentage actually represented a sharp rise from the previous
 four decades of presidential voting.5
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 The Navajo Nation Council currently consists of eighty-eight
 delegates, although a recent tribal referendum (September 5, 2000), if
 successful, would have reduced the size of the council from eighty-
 eight to twenty-four delegates.6 The final vote was 22,016 in favor of
 reducing the council to 9,319 opposed, but the referendum failed be-
 cause it required 50 percent plus one of the total number of registered
 voters to cast a "yes" vote. The official number of registered voters on
 the reservation at the time of the election was 92,261; thus, 46,131 votes
 in favor were needed in order for the referendum to be approved.
 The council is led by the speaker of the council, who is the pre-
 siding officer of the council. Although the Secretary of the Interior
 continues to wield veto power over certain council decisions, the
 Navajo political system, with the Title II changes in the executive
 branch in 1989, has more comparability than ever before to state gov-
 ernments and the federal government.
 Many Navajos, however, believe that it is in their best interest
 to adhere to and enhance what is most distinctive about the Navajo
 people, especially in the areas of cultural retention and values specific
 to the Dine, and most important, to retain and invigorate the Navajo
 language. Otherwise, there is a sense that the nation might face a per-
 manent and irreversible identity crisis. In fact, for some Navajos, this is
 the lesson of the appearance and destructive force of the hantavirus in
 1993 and the reported appearance of two Navajo deities to an elderly
 woman in 1996 warning the people to revive traditional values and be-
 liefs or face severe consequences.
 Navajos also understand that sovereignty and self-government
 imply a necessity and the inclination to negotiate appropriate agree-
 ments with surrounding states, other tribes, and the federal govern-
 ment. A good example of this is the sovereignty accord signed in 1992
 between President Peterson Zah and the governors of New Mexico,
 Utah, and Arizona. This policy declared that the interactions of the
 four sovereigns would "be predicated on a government-to-government
 relationship" and that all future relations would be "carried forward in a
 spirit of cooperation, coordination, communication, and good will."7 >
 The Navajo Nation operates one of the most complex political
 systems in Indian Country. The nation, unlike some other tribal gov-
 ernments, generally approaches the negotiating table with a political-
 ly united front, although the events surrounding Peter MacDonald's
 last days in office in the late 1980s threatened that relative political 3 93
 homogeneity for a brief but intense period of time. This is not meant
 to imply that Navajo citizens are always in agreement with the leg- ?
 islative, executive, or judicial decisions of their policy makers, but
 rather points out that the intense intratribal conflicts that have recent-
 ly hampered the self-determination efforts of tribes like the Cherokee
 of Oklahoma, the Tohono O'odham of southern Arizona, the Lumbee
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 of North Carolina, and others, are not a major or persistent problem
 for the Navajos.
 In a sense, the political cohesiveness of the Navajo people can be
 viewed positively. It means that the Navajo Nation Council is the rec-
 ognized voice of all Navajos, although there are always exceptions
 (e.g., at present, the Navajos living around Big Mountain may hold a
 contrary view). Generally, political divisiveness does not threaten the
 integrity of Navajo national government.
 On the other hand, the absence of a politically active traditional
 government segment implies that a great deal of Navajo tradition has
 already been displaced. This loss has been more pronounced in the ex-
 ecutive and legislative branches. The judicial branch, conversely, has
 shown a greater willingness to integrate traditional Navajo legal and
 social values into the already established Western legal system that is
 generally operative throughout the reservation.
 For instance, in 1982, Navajo judges implemented Peacemaker
 Courts, which utilize traditional Navajo dispute resolution techniques
 to resolve local disputes.8 Additionally, the courts of the Navajo Nation
 have gone even further and in 1991 adopted a new code of judicial
 conduct. This code uses many principles of the American Bar Associa-
 tion's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, but it also incorporates a num-
 ber of uniquely Navajo legal values as well.9
 The Navajo people have witnessed the executive and legislative
 branches of their government, and the judicial to a lesser extent, as-
 sume the functions, the institutions, the technologies, the politics, and
 in some respects, even the goals of the larger society. Some Navajos
 feel it is not now possible, or even advisable, to reverse this trend and
 argue that a revival of traditional Dine structures of governance would
 disrupt existing internal and external working relationships already in
 place (i.e., within the tribe, and between the states and federal govern-
 ment). On the other hand, some of the traditional Navajo population
 and an increasing number of younger Navajos fear that, unless im-
 mediate steps are taken to reintroduce even more traditional Navajo
 concepts and structures beyond those already in place in the judicial
 branch, the qualities that distinguish Navajos from other tribes and
 racial/ethnic groups may be lost forever.
 James Q. Wilson, a noted political scientist, has stated that "judg-
 ments about institutions and interests can only be made after one has
 94 I seen how they behave on a variety of important issues or potential is-
 sues."'0 In this regard, Navajo national government, as presently con-
 stituted, is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, members of the nation's
 council, the judicial system, the executive branch, and the growing
 tribal bureaucracy are part of a very old society with roots going back
 hundreds of generations.
 Navajo citizens, like citizens of the larger society, tend to assume
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 that the way decisions are made now are the only way decisions can
 be made. In fact, there are many other ways to operate government
 based on popular consensus. Navajo traditions, history, and beliefs
 weigh heavily, whether consciously or not, on what is decided by trib-
 al leaders.
 DINt TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT
 From a Western European political perspective, the Navajo Nation was
 nonexistent as a representative political body until the 1920s. The
 Navajo people were, of course, cohesive in that they had a common
 linguistic and cultural heritage, lived within a well-defined territory,
 and referred to themselves as Dine. But their political organization, in
 general, did not extend beyond local bands that were led by head-
 men, or naataanii. We will soon discuss a political/ceremonial/economic
 gathering known as the Naachid that did, in fact, wield a more region-
 alized sphere of influence, but it is important to remember that even
 this body had no coercive powers and apparently never represented all
 Navajos. To put it another way, before the arrival of the Americans in
 the nineteenth century, the Navajo people did without a tribalwide rep-
 resentative government that resembled the governments of the United
 States or Western European countries.
 The Naataanii (Headmen and Headwomen
 of Traditional Society)
 The Navajo origin story contains the first specific reference to individu-
 als regarded as leaders by Dine. These first naataanii were selected by
 the Diyin Dine (Holy People) to provide discipline to the people of
 the Third World. According to the story and contemporary oral ac-
 counts, as interpreted by Richard Van Valkenburgh, "[The] function of
 these leaders . . . was directed toward the correction of behavior, the
 maintenance of certain moral injunctions, such as the prohibition of
 incest and adultery, as well as the enforcement of economic laws." The
 naataanii also served as intermediaries between the Dine and the Diyin
 Dine. When the Spanish arrived in the late 1500s, the fundamental po-
 litical entity in Navajo society was the natural community. This collec-
 tive unit of government was basically economic in nature, geographi-
 cally determined, and was distinct from other local units. Population 95
 figures for these communities vary, but the most informed accounts es-
 timate that a natural community contained from ten to forty families.
 Each of these settlements was directed by a naataanii, who received ad-
 vice and counsel from hastoi and hataali.1 Internal matters, intertribal
 affairs, hunting, and food gathering were issues regularly addressed by
 this deliberative body of leaders.
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 The Navajo people recognized, as did other indigenous nations
 like the Cherokee and the Creek, the importance of having separate
 war and peace leaders for the successful functioning of tribal harmony.
 Seldom did one person fill both offices. To attain the position of a war
 naataanii, an individual needed extensive knowledge of one or more of
 the War Ways. Anyone who had acquired this ritual knowledge was
 eligible to serve as a war leader. These were ceremonies designed to
 bring about successful raids or counterraids against outside forces. The
 Navajo attitude toward war leaders, according to Hill, was equivocal.
 That is to say, while these individuals were respected as great fighters,
 they were also frequently criticized. It was believed by some Navajo
 that war leaders were largely responsible for the defeat and imprison-
 ment of Navajo at Bosque Redondo in the 1860s.12
 A peace naataanii, by contrast, was chosen or elected if he or she
 had knowledge of the Blessing Way ceremony, and only if he or she
 had excellent moral character, great oratorical abilities, and charisma.
 The individual also had to possess the ability to serve in both the sa-
 cred and day-to-day aspects of Navajo life and culture. In effect, the
 selection of a naataanii followed a democratic process involving the
 adult population of a natural community.
 Once selected, naataanii were put through an initiation cere-
 mony during which the leader's lips were coated with corn pollen
 taken from the four sacred mountains. This action was meant to enable
 the leader to give powerful speeches. At such an occasion songs were
 sung and sacred tobacco, also brought from the sacred peaks, was
 smoked by distinguished individuals.13
 The peace naataanii was not a hereditary position. However,
 once in office, the individual usually remained for life. These persons,
 before their death, were expected to step down and identify a succes-
 sor, although the community could decide not to accept the recom-
 mendation. There is evidence that women were occasionally selected
 for this important position. The peace leader oversaw the economic
 development of the community, arbitrated family disputes, dealt with
 > witchcraft issues, and served as the diplomatic representative between
 their natural outfit and other local communities, tribes, and later with
 the Spanish, Mexican, and American governments. Neither a peace
 0
 nor a war naataanii, it is important to remember, had coercive powers,
 and his or her effectiveness depended almost entirely upon the quality
 96 of their personal character.
 0
 0 THE NAACHID
 z
 Q Based largely on oral accounts, there is strong evidence to support the
 existence of a periodic tribal assembly. This regional gathering of peace
 and war leaders was called a Naachid, literally meaning "to gesture with
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 the hand." The most detailed written account of a Naachid (the last
 one was reportedly held in the 1850s or 1860s) comes from the writ-
 ings of Richard Van Valkenburgh. He noted that the assembly was
 called "at two and four year intervals and, should a tribal emergency
 arise, could be called in an odd year." Twenty-four leaders-twelve war
 and twelve peace (some sources claim that there were six of each)-
 would meet in a specially constructed hogan. Valkenburgh noted that
 at a prescribed time during the assembly, a four-day dance was con-
 ducted. After the dance, a succession of meetings and dances was held
 throughout the winter, with the assembly adjourning after the spring
 planting.
 The Naachid was held for several purposes. Ceremonially, it was
 conducted to insure an abundance of water and soil fertility. It also
 served at times as a war council or a peace council. For example, it was
 reported in December 1840 that "Navajos held a Naachid ceremony
 west of Canyon de Chelly for the purpose of making peace with the
 Mexicans. On this date, Jose Andres Sandoval, justice atJemez, report-
 ed to the governor: 'At nightfall of this day [December 14] a Navajo
 known as Anceluno presented himself in this pueblo [Jemez] soliciting
 peace in the name of his nation.'""4
 During peaceful years, the peace naataanii chaired the assembly.
 However, when war or other outside threats arose, the war naataanii
 had the proceedings. Women played an active role in the Naachid, and
 could speak openly to the gathered delegates if they had participated
 in raids or had achieved prominent status through some other means.
 The decisions of the Naachid were not binding on the assembled
 Navajos (and certainly not on any outfits not present), and those who
 disagreed with the gathering's decisions were not compelled to obey
 and suffered no reprisals.
 Throughout the millennia when the Naachid was active, it played
 a number of vital roles. When war began, many Navajo could gather
 quickly. Although natural community leaders exercised considerable
 regional influence, a political regrouping occurred when the Naachid
 convened. Speakers at the assembly were not chosen by formal votes; >
 instead, the general assembly's informal approval and acknowledgment
 were required. Some accounts stress that the Naachid's primary role was
 ceremonial in nature and that it functioned politically only when out-
 side threats compelled the assembled Navajo to act as a political unit.
 97
 DINt GOVERNMENT, 1700-1846
 Despite Spanish intrusion into Navajo country by the early 1600s
 and continuing through the early 1800s, traditional Navajo govern-
 ing structures remained intact. Although the Navajo population had
 gradually shifted west, largely because of Spanish, Ute, and Comanche
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 incursions, the natural communities, the naataanii, and the Naachid
 continued to serve as the basic Navajo political units. There is evi-
 dence that during the Spanish period five loose Navajo political sub-
 divisions coalesced. These were located at Mount Taylor, Cebolleta,
 Chuska, Bear Springs, and Canyon de Chelly.
 The Spanish, meanwhile, continued to carefully "select" those
 Navajo leaders who would best serve them as political and military al-
 lies. For example, the Navajo headman Don Carlos was chosen and
 anointed by the Spanish as the "Navajo General" of the entire nation. But
 when he proved to be ineffective, according to the Spanish officials, he
 was removed from office and replaced by Antonio el Pinto. The Spanish
 governor de la Concha wrote this glowing, if questionable, description
 of el Pinto and described his alleged authority over all Navajos:
 [A]n Indian of extraordinary talent, and one whom the
 whole nation respects and obeys in the manner which is
 customary to civilized nations with an authorized com-
 mander. These qualities are rare in a class of people who
 are led along the path of reason by only profit or fear and
 this is recognized by his own people, which causes them
 to venerate him.15
 There were other occasions when the Spanish attempted to "des-
 ignate" Navajo individuals and declare them the head of all the nation.
 In fact, Spanish diplomatic and military efforts to firm up their position
 in New Mexico by exploiting one group of Navajos against others led
 to a long-lasting schism between the Navajo in the early part of the
 nineteenth century that lasts to this day.
 The separation began in 1818 when a Navajo headman, Joaquin,
 visited the Spaniards in the Jemez Pueblo. Joaquin told the Spanish of-
 ficials that despite his efforts to maintain peace, other Navajos were
 preparing for war because they were angry at Spanish encroachments
 on their lands. Joaquin, frustrated at what he considered the more mili-
 tant attitude of western Navajo, had physically relocated his own people
 closer to the Spanish settlements and went as far as severing connec-
 tions with the rest of the Dine people. This action placed Joaquin's
 small band into the role of "being traitors to the main Navajo tribe and
 subservient to the government at Santa Fe. From this time forward,
 98 Joaquin's small group would be referred to as the Dine Ana'i or Enemy
 Navajos."16
 Schemes to fabricate a central Navajo political figurehead were
 also employed at various times by the Mexican and U.S. governments.
 The anointed "Navajo Generals," however, never represented more
 than a handful of Navajo families despite the contentions or grandiose
 terms applied to them by the Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. governments.
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 DINt GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE DURING
 THE EARLY AMERICAN PERIOD, 1846-1921
 When the United States replaced the Mexican government as the
 dominant foreign influence in the Southwest in 1846, it was immedi-
 ately faced with the task of trying to establish peaceful relations with
 the independent and powerful Navajos, the various bands of Apaches,
 and many other tribes. This Herculean task was complicated by the de-
 centralized Navajo political structure and by the enslavement of a large
 number of Navajo women and children being held in captivity by New
 Mexicans.
 The U.S. military and government officials, despite some seven-
 ty years of experience in dealing with tribal nations, naively believed
 that a treaty signed by a few Navajo headmen would bind the entire
 nation. Thus, the American government, like the two preceding na-
 tions, equated Navajo political and social structures with those of the
 federal and European political systems.
 Between 1846 and 1868, the Navajo signed nine separate treaties
 with the United States. The first took place in the fall of 1846 when the
 U.S. Army and over five hundred Navajos, led by fourteen headmen,
 signed a treaty of peace at Ojo del Oso (Fort Wingate, New Mexico).
 Navajo raids continued, however, reflecting the decentralized political
 reality of Navajo tribal existence. This treaty, like those of 1848, 1851,
 1855, two in 1858, and 1861, was not ratified by the U.S. Senate. Only
 the 1849 and 1868 treaties were ratified. The early nonratified treaties
 usually included provisions regarding the establishment of peace, the
 regulation of commerce, the exchange of prisoners, and the return of
 stolen property. The later ones focused more on peace and clarification
 of Navajo territorial boundaries.
 Sometime before 1858, the Naachid apparently ceased to func-
 tion. American military campaigns and the hardships of widespread
 disbursement of the Navajo people severely inhibited gatherings of
 this tribal assembly. The Long Walk to Fort Sumner and the subse-
 quent four-year confinement of Navajos at Bosque Redondo from 1864 >
 to 1868 worked against the practice of keeping the Naachid function-
 al. The evidence suggests that the Naachid was never again reconsti-
 tuted because most of the older Navajos who knew how to conduct it
 had died during their oppressive years of imprisonment.
 With the Naachid permanently broken, the Navajos turned to 3 99
 individual naataanii for direction and leadership. General Carleton, the
 mastermind behind the devastating Fort Sumner experience, had actu-
 ally planned in the early stages of preparing the fort to further break
 the Navajo natural leadership by subdividing the Navajo population
 (more than eight thousand) into twelve villages, to be situated half a
 mile apart. Each village was to have a chief or headman, appointed by
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 the military officer in charge, and one subchief for every one hundred
 Navajos. Carleton's "political organization" plan for the nation was
 never implemented, however, because Navajos preferred to live in their
 extended families and small bands and did not want to live in close
 proximity with the Mescalero Apache, their enemies, who were also
 confined at the fort.
 When the Navajos were released from Fort Sumner, they recog-
 nized a need to reconstitute themselves, politically, socially, and cere-
 monially. Oral accounts relate that sometime during the fall of 1868,
 the people, led by their peace naataanii and medicine men, assembled
 in Window Rock to perform a Blessing Way ceremony. For seven days,
 thirteen leaders and medicine men fasted and prayed, seeking spiritual
 guidance and protection. During the ceremony "Sacred Mountain Dirt
 Bundles" (dzil leezh) were tied together, and each of the leaders received
 a bundle. When the ceremony concluded, each of the leaders was in-
 structed by the medicine man to carry his personal bundle through
 Window Rock four times. After this, the people dispersed to the four
 directions to begin their lives anew.
 For a period, the Indian agent accepted those Navajo who had
 emerged from Fort Sumner as the recognized political leadership of
 the nation, including Barboncito, Ganado Mucho, Delgadito, Narbona,
 and Mariano. By the early 1880s, the Navajo Indian agent told the
 Secretary of the Interior that there were four major settlements of
 Navajos, each under the control of a chief or chiefs: North of Agency,
 led by Chief Francisco Capitan (population 4,000); East of Agency,
 Chief Manuelito (population 4,000); South of Agency, Chiefs Mariano
 and Tsi'naajini Biye' (population 4,000); and West of Agency, led by
 Head Chief Ganado Mucho (population 4,000).17
 Gradually, as these leaders died, and with federal policy shifting
 toward a more coercive form of assimilation, the Navajo Indian agent
 began acting in a more autocratic fashion. From 1878 to 1910, the
 "Head Chiefs" of the Navajo people were "appointed" by the Navajo
 3 Indian agent and were confirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.
 > Manuelito, who had been appointed in 1870, served until 1884 when
 the Indian agent replaced him with Henry Chee Dodge, a bilingual,
 mixed-blood Navajo.
 Besides the head chiefs, regional naataanii, also selected by the
 agent, continued to guide their communities. There were an estimated
 100 3 thirty local headmen functioning throughout the reservation in 1900.
 The Indian agent annually assembled the head chief and regional lead-
 ? ers to discuss important issues. Clearly, the Navajo Indian agent, living
 at Fort Defiance by this time, wielded an extreme amount of authority.
 Valkenburgh pointed out that "agents-deliberately smashed all native
 power, and those naat'aanih who refused to 'play ball,' lost all govern-
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 ment recognition and, without that, soon lost influence over the
 people in that region."
 Although the agent selected and directed these "Agency Chiefs,"
 Mary Shepardson reported that there remained "the old informal lead-
 ers, local headmen, wealthy stock-owners, ceremonial practitioners,
 and heads of large family groups [who] constituted the defacto leader-
 ship of the localities."
 By 1900 the Navajo Reservation had nearly quadrupled in size
 through executive order extensions, and it was evident that a single
 federal agent could no longer oversee the affairs of such a greatly ex-
 panded land base. Moreover, the population had doubled and then
 stood at nearly 15,000. Thus, to regain a better administrative posi-
 tion, Navajo territory was divided into six separate agency jurisdic-
 tions, each with their own superintendent, between 1901 and 1934. This
 included an agency for the Hopi Tribe that also served Navajos. The
 agencies were the Western Navajo at Tuba City; the San Juan Agency
 at Shiprock; the Navajo Agency at Fort Defiance; the Pueblo Bonito at
 Crownpoint, New Mexico; the Leupp Agency at Leupp; and the Hopi
 at Keams Canyon.
 According to Robert Young, the subdivision of the reservation
 into six separate units, combined with an increase in staff and a smaller
 land area, "led to the abandonment of the previous system of appoin-
 tive chiefs .... By 1910 the use of appointive chiefs was abandoned
 completely."18
 THE FIRST NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL
 As noted above, there was no Navajo national government before the
 1920s except for the brief if coerced cohesion generated by the Fort
 Sumner incarceration. But when oil was discovered on the treaty
 portion of the reservation in 1922, the federal government established
 the semblance of a central Navajo governing authority with which
 Washington might interact in providing leases for mineral develop-
 ment. Prior to this, interested energy companies had to contact the >
 agency superintendent, who then convened a "general council" of adult
 Navajos in that agency to consider the companies' requests for leases.
 But as Lawrence Kelly noted, "the obvious implication was that the
 councils were to be subordinate to the government agent," for the
 Navajos "were not members of any deliberative body which had been 101
 in existence prior to that time."
 Oil and gas companies, anxious to exploit the perceived mineral
 wealth of the reservation, pressured the Department of the Interior and
 agency superintendents to convene additional "general councils" in
 both the San Juan (Shiprock) and Southern Navajo (Fort Defiance)
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 agencies. And although several new leases were granted by the Navajos
 to the companies, most were rejected.
 Rebuffed, the oil companies then exerted more pressure on the
 Interior Department and the commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA) to
 take away the inherent leasing power of the Navajos and place it in the
 hands of a federal representative. The Navajos, however, refused to
 surrender their right to lease their lands.
 Two developments in the fall of 1922 signaled an end to the leas-
 ing stalemate. First, the Interior Department changed its policy and
 now asserted that oil and gas royalties, bonuses, and rentals derived
 from discoveries in any part of the reservation belonged to the Navajo
 Tribe as a whole, and not "exclusively to those Navajo residents in
 whose jurisdiction it was found." Second, this policy change resulted in
 the Interior's creation of a "business council" that was initially com-
 posed of three Navajos authorized to deal with lease grants: Henry
 Chee Dodge, Charlie Mitchell, and Daagha'chii Bikiss. These men were
 apparently selected by the Secretary of the Interior. However, the le-
 gality of this nonrepresentative and nonelected body was immediately
 questioned because it utterly failed to meet the 1868 treaty require-
 ment of securing the approval of three-fourths of the adult males when
 any transactions involving Navajo lands occur.
 A more representative council had to be devised. Albert Fall, the
 Secretary of the Interior, on January 3, 1923, proceeded to contact Mr.
 Herbert J. Hagerman, former territorial governor of New Mexico, and
 offered him the position of "Special Commissioner to Negotiate with
 Indians." Hagerman accepted the appointment as commissioner to the
 Navajos, and was granted general authority over the five Navajo agen-
 cies. On January 23, the CIA Charles Burke issued a document entitled
 "Regulations Related to the Navajo Tribe of Indians," which the Navajos
 had not seen. This document established procedures to create the first
 Navajo Tribal Council. The council was to consist of one delegate and
 one alternate from each agency, plus a chair and vice chair. This body
 was touted as an organization "with which administrative officers of
 the Government may directly deal in all matters affecting the tribe."
 The chair of the council was to be elected by the council delegates at
 the first meeting and was to be selected from the tribal membership
 at large. Apparently, once chosen, the chair and vice chair could have
 held office indefinitely since no fixed terms were specified. The chair
 102 P also functioned as a council member as well as the presiding officer fol-
 lowing his election. The vice chair was to be selected from the coun-
 cil's own membership.
 If an agency failed to elect a delegate to the council within thirty
 days, the Secretary of the Interior would fill the position with his own
 appointment. Furthermore, the tribal council could not meet without
 the commissioner's presence. And interestingly enough, the Interior
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 Department reserved the right to remove any council member upon
 proper cause. The document contained no statement of legislative or
 other formal powers. The council was to serve primarily as a consulta-
 tive group, though it did have power to consent to leases.
 Once these regulations reached the Navajos, they attacked the
 removal power of the Secretary of the Interior and objected to the
 number of delegates and alternates representing each agency. Subse-
 quent to these objections, the regulations were rewritten on April 24.
 The new laws excluded the removal clause and provided for a forum,
 interpreters, and a means of succession in the event that the chair or
 vice chair positions became vacated. Finally, the number of delegates
 and alternates to the council was increased from twelve to twenty-four.
 In other words, there were to be twelve voting delegates and twelve
 nonvoting alternates.
 The Secretary of the Interior, nevertheless, maintained tremen-
 dous authority over the tribal council. He could make appointments
 when the Navajos refused to do so in a given period of time; meetings
 could be held only in the presence of a federal representative; and the
 council could convene only at the discretion of the commissioner of
 the tribe, who was solely responsible for calling the meetings.
 The newly elected councilmen held their first meeting at Toad-
 lena, New Mexico, on July 7, 1923. The council elected Chee Dodge
 as chair, but for some reason failed to elect a vice chair. Then they
 unanimously approved a resolution-drafted in Washington-which
 gave Commissioner Hagerman the authority to sign all oil and gas
 leases "on behalf of the Navajo Indians." In effect, their first action es-
 sentially eliminated the principal reason the council was organized,
 which had been to approve leases on behalf of their people. According
 to Lawrence Kelly, the council apparently agreed to this resolution be-
 cause they believed that they "would receive government aid in secur-
 ing new lands." The council would not regain this important power
 until 1933.
 The tribal council met annually, usually for two days, and gener-
 ally functioned as little more than an "advisor" to Commissioner >
 Hagerman during the next decade of its existence. The council was
 largely a creature of the Secretary of the Interior and certainly not an
 organization exercising powers of self-government. In April 1927, the
 council's regulations were amended to allow council members and ex-
 ecutive officers to serve five-year terms, instead of four. The following ? 103
 year, October 15, 1928, a third set of regulations was issued by the
 CIA. These included provisions that gave women the right to vote, au-
 thorized the CIA instead of the commissioner of the Navajo Tribe to
 call meetings, and reestablished the term of office at four years.
 There were but two other major changes in the regulations be-
 fore tribal reorganization began in 1936. On October 3, 1933, under
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Tom Dodge's chairmanship (Chee Dodge's son), the tribal council, in
 an act of sovereignty, "revoked" and "canceled" the power of attorney it
 had ceded to the federal government at the council's first meeting in
 1923. The council also became more outspoken in the kinds of issues
 it would concern itself with, including chapter organization, employ-
 ment, education, water projects, tribal resources, health, education, and
 livestock issues.'9
 On July 10, 1934 the council unanimously voted to give council
 alternates the right to vote as full-fledged delegates. The tribal council
 now had twenty-four functioning members and was adamant about
 issues that other governments concern themselves with.
 NAVAJO TRIBAL REORGANIZATION,
 1936-1938
 The subject of Navajo tribal government in the 1930s is closely inter-
 twined and affected by the quality and extent of Navajo lands, erosion
 cycles, the personalities of certain tribal and federal workers, water
 development projects like the Hoover (also called Boulder) Dam, and,
 of course, livestock. The Navajo subsistence system was already in
 danger by 1930 as evidenced by the William Zeh report. Zeh was a
 forester for the BIA who, in a detailed report on the overgrazed Navajo
 range, reported that 1.3 million sheep and goats were living on less
 than 12 million acres of land. Such large numbers of livestock (horses
 and cattle were not included in his data) were causing real damage
 to the land. But Zeh did not recommend massive livestock reduc-
 tion. Instead, he called for the reservation to be expanded, urged the
 elimination of excess horses, and suggested improved breeds of sheep
 and goats. He only recommended a gradual reduction in the number
 of goats.20
 In fact, the winters of 1931-32 and 1932-33 were particularly
 harsh, and thousands of sheep and goats starved, reducing the number
 of sheep and goats. Simultaneously, Congress authorized the Colorado
 > River Project, whose main cog was Hoover Dam. When completed,
 the dam created a 150-mile-long lake that protected much of Southern
 California, created an improved irrigation system, and generated elec-
 0
 N tricity for the Southwest.
 v But within a few years, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that
 104 3 silt from the San Juan and the Little Colorado Rivers, which course
 through the Navajo Reservation, would eventually pile up behind the
 ? dam and make it useless within a few years. In effect, the Hoover Dam
 was the catalyst for the drastic livestock reduction that would then
 ensue. According to White, the government "misunderstood the ero-
 sion cycle and its causes and blamed it largely on Navajo lands" and
 acted more to benefit economic development in the Southwest than to
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 protect Navajos.2' Ultimately, Navajo herds were dramatically reduced
 from 1,053,498 sheep units in 1933 to 449,000 in 1946 when active re-
 duction was stopped.
 In effect, the stock reduction program served as the impetus by
 which the Navajo people came to see that the decisions of their gov-
 ernment, the Navajo Tribal Council, for good or ill had real import for
 their lives and pocketbooks. CIA John Collier convinced the tribal
 council to approve and participate in the livestock reduction program
 with promises that if it did new lands would be added to the reser-
 vation in Arizona and New Mexico. Although some lands were added
 to the Western Navajo Agency, the promised lands were not forth-
 coming in New Mexico due to powerful non-Indian interests in the
 state. Gradually, the Navajo people lost what little faith they still had
 in the tribal council.
 The council, for its part, was in a profound dilemma. The need for
 some livestock reduction appeared a reasonable request, and the oppor-
 tunity to gain additional lands if they did was an important impetus to
 accept the government's reduction plan. But the council was already
 feeling pressure from the people that the program was not fair and was
 leaving many Navajo families destitute. On the other hand, if they had
 not supported Collier and his soil conservation program, it was clear
 that the government would carry out stock reduction anyway.
 The Navajo Tribe, like most other tribes, was given an opportu-
 nity to establish a constitutional form of government in 1934 under the
 auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act. This major law was the
 brainchild of CIA John Collier, and it gave tribes a two-year period
 to vote on whether they wished to adopt or reject the act's provisions.
 For many reasons, not the least of which was the government's forced
 reduction of Navajo livestock, the Navajo people narrowly rejected
 the act, by a vote of 8,197 to 7,679. Collier was deeply hurt by the
 Navajos' rejection of his measure. But he continued to express a need
 for an overhaul of Navajo government. And as already noted, many
 Navajos now viewed the tribal council with disdain, believing that it
 had aided and supported the federal government's stock reduction pro-
 gram and did not truly represent the views of the Navajo people.
 The last meeting of the original tribal council was held Nov-
 ember 24, 1936, under acting chairman Marcus Kanuho.22 Jacob C.
 Morgan, the Shiprock council delegate, and the most outspoken oppo-
 nent of stock reduction, protested the impending breakup of the old 105
 tribal council. Nevertheless, during this last meeting the council estab-
 lished an executive committee charged with calling a constitutional as-
 sembly for the purpose of writing and adopting a tribal constitution.
 This executive committee, led by Chee Dodge, Marcus Kanuho,
 Henry Taliman, and Father Bernard Haile, toured the reservation
 throughout the winter, and by February 1937 had a working list of 250
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 nominees for the constitutional assembly. The executive committee ul-
 timately pared this number down to seventy. When the seventy dele-
 gates met that spring, their principle objective was to appoint a com-
 mittee to draft a constitution. Once written, it would be sent to the
 Interior Department for approval and then sent back to the council and
 tribal members for ratification.
 The constitution was completed later that year. The proposed
 organic act mirrored those of tribes who had accepted the Indian
 Reorganization Act's provisions. It laid out the membership require-
 ments and created a council as the legislative body. It was to be com-
 posed of seventy-four delegates, apportioned at the rate of one for
 every six hundred Navajos. It spelled out eligibility criteria for council
 members and provided for six-year terms of office. The executive
 branch was to consist of a president and vice president, who would also
 serve six-year terms. Importantly, the constitution outlined and delim-
 ited the council's powers. These included, but were not limited to, the
 regulation, use, and distribution of tribal property; the regulation of
 trade; the levying of taxes; the establishment of inheritance laws; and
 the hiring of legal counsel.
 The constitution also contained a clause, common for that time,
 which declared that "any resolution or ordinance adopted by the
 Navajo Council or Executive Committee shall take effect as soon as ap-
 proved by the Secretary of the Interior."23 In other words, all the tribes'
 decisions, had the constitution been adopted, would have had to be ap-
 proved by the Secretary of the Interior. For a number of complicated
 reasons,24 including the fact that Morgan and his associates had be-
 come so vehement in their opposition to the constitutional process, the
 Secretary of the Interior, fearing a permanent political split in the tribe
 and more hostility to the stock-reduction program, rejected the consti-
 tution. Instead, the BIA gave the assembly delegates the option of de-
 claring themselves to be the new tribal council. The delegates voted
 themselves into office, and later in 1938 the Secretary of the Interior
 issued a simplified set of bylaws called "Rules for the Navajo Tribal
 Council." These new "Rules," however, were sufficient only for the elec-
 tion of the new tribal council and executive officers. Furthermore, the
 V> 1938 "Rules" did not define the scope or limits of the council's authority,
 0
 nor did the Navajo electorate have any say about the regulations.
 16u Following these latest "Rules," the first election was held Sep-
 106 P tember 24, 1938; Jacob C. Morgan was elected chairman and Howard
 G Corman was chosen vice chairman. The first tribal council meeting
 ? was convened on November 8, 1938. The 1938 bylaws increased the
 membership of the council to seventy-four delegates. The CIA lost the
 right to appoint delegates, but the council meetings still required
 the presence of a federal official, the superintendent, "who occupied a
 position beside the chairman in the conduct of Council meetings."25
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 The council, during the first meeting, chose not to bring forward
 the executive committee. The delegates insisted that all decisions be
 made by the full council. This was done in part because the previous
 executive committee had approved the hated "grazing regulation." The
 1938 "Rules for the Navajo Tribal Council," with important modifi-
 cations to be discussed later, still constitute the basis for present-day
 Navajo national government. Robert Young, in his work The Navajo Year-
 book, pointed out that
 There has been a growing tendency on the part of the fed-
 eral government as well as that of the Tribe, to equate the
 powers of the Council with those residual sovereign powers
 remaining in the Tribe although the Tribe has never acted
 formally to recognize the Council as the governmental or-
 ganization authorized by the people to exercise those powers
 in their behalf. (emphasis added)
 DINt TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, 1940-1989
 The 1938 "Rules" were amended several times during this period, but in
 some important respects the current structure of the Navajo national
 government remained subject to the influence of the Interior Depart-
 ment. This is reflected in the fact that major amendments and changes
 in the organization or election procedures still require approval by the
 Secretary of the Interior.
 During this half century, the Navajo Nation fully entered the
 wage economy. The nation was also dramatically affected by World
 War II. Some 3,600 Navajos served in the military and nearly 15,000
 worked in war-related activities. When this global conflict was over,
 most of these Navajos returned to the reservation to find scant re-
 sources and even fewer jobs. Their agitation about these conditions led
 some Navajos to move permanently to cities in search of employment.
 Two other developments were of profound importance in the late u
 1940s. In 1947, the tribal council established an advisory committee
 (formerly the executive committee) that, some say, institutionalized
 Navajo government. Also in 1947, the council entered into a contract
 with an attorney, Norman Littell, who was to oversee the tribe's legal
 claims against the United States and the land conflicts with the Hopi
 Nation, and who also provided general legal services to the nation. P 107
 Three years later Congress stepped forward in an effort to ease
 the economic suffering of the Navajo and Hopi peoples. In 1950 Con-
 gress enacted the Navajo-Hopi Long-Range Rehabilitation Act, which
 funneled some $88 million to both tribes for a wide range of programs
 aimed at economically and socially revitalizing both tribes. Important-
 ly, this measure also authorized the Navajo to adopt a constitution,
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 which, once written, would have to be ratified by the Navajo people.
 Littell, aware of this provision even while the act was pending, soon
 had written a draft constitution. In his own words the "constitution has
 been drafted to give you, the Navajo Tribal Council and the Navajo
 people, all the power I could get into that constitution under the law."26
 The 1950s are referred to by some as the time when the Navajo
 Nation was born. This is arguable, but it is certainly true that many
 changes occurred that broadened the scope of Navajo government. It
 represents an era, according to Peter Iverson,
 When Navajo government leaders were engaged in broad-
 ening the scope and ambition of tribal government pro-
 grams and reorganizing the structure of Navajo govern-
 ment in order to carry out these programs. The existence
 of newly found revenue encouraged these leaders to in-
 volve the tribal government in unprecedented fashion ...
 to improve the quality of Navajo life. Significant revision
 of the government's organization included revival of the
 chapter system and the expansion of the responsibilities of
 the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.27
 Let us return to the issue of a constitution. In 1953, a more fully
 developed constitution was completed and sent to the CIA for review
 and approval. Like the constitutional attempt in 1934, it also was simi-
 lar to those of Indian Reorganization Act tribes who had approved
 constitutions. However, several years of negotiating with BIA officials
 convinced the tribal council that "under the language of the Navajo-
 Hopi Long-Range Rehabilitation Act, if the constitution is adopted, it
 would strengthen the veto power of the Secretary rather than weaken
 it."28 This fear of secretarial power would remain an obstacle to the ap-
 proval of a constitution for a number of years, though ironically the
 council's foundation itself continues to rest upon secretarial regulations
 that give the Secretary of the Interior veto power over tribal ordi-
 > nances in a number of major areas. Thus, the tribal council has con-
 tinued to exercise a growing array of powers through resolutions that
 remain subject to secretarial veto. In 1962 the tribe's resolutions were
 codified into a tribal code modeled after federal codes. In a broad
 u sense, the codified tribal code was the Navajo constitution, though it
 108 has never been ratified by the tribal electorate.29
 From 1962, when the tribal code was codified, until the civil unrest
 in 1989, the Navajo government continued to expand in profound ways.
 The availability of income, both from the federal government and from
 the extraction of natural resources (i.e., timber, coal, oil, gas, uranium,
 etc.), provided the tribal government with funds, however tenuous, that
 enabled the tribe to exercise a growing measure of self-determination.
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 The civil rights movement spawned the Great Society and the
 War on Poverty programs of the federal government, which, taken to-
 gether, increased the tribe's position nationally and internationally and
 were also positive developments that facilitated growth within the na-
 tion. For example, in 1965 the Navajo Tribal Council established the
 Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity (ONEO), which received
 federal funding from the Office of Economic Opportunity for neigh-
 borhood youth corps programs, small business development, Head
 Start programs, etc. Peter MacDonald, a future chairman, was the first
 executive director of ONEO. Yet another Great Society program, the
 Office of Navajo Economic Legal Aid and Defender Society (DNA),
 was also established under ONEO. Peterson Zah, another future tribal
 chairman/president, headed this organization for a period. Both Zah
 and MacDonald used these important positions as springboards into
 tribal leadership. Education also received the focused attention of the
 tribal council, and in 1968 the council officially approved the estab-
 lishment of Navajo Community College, the first tribally controlled
 community college in the nation.
 Peter MacDonald was elected chairman in 1970. He served three
 consecutive terms before being defeated by Peterson Zah in 1982.
 MacDonald was reelected in 1986. The MacDonald years began dur-
 ing the so-called Indian self-determination period, intended to allow
 tribes greater political and economic freedoms to govern their own
 lives and resources. MacDonald, the first university-educated chair-
 man, was a dynamic speaker and was effective, particularly in his early
 years, in attracting national attention and prestige to the nation. There
 were also a number of impressive and startling changes in Navajo gov-
 ernment structure with MacDonald amassing a tremendous amount of
 power in the executive branch.
 Reorganization of the tribal government consisted of two parts:
 "the revision and alteration of the council committee system and the
 restructuring of the tribal government framework. Through the first
 part of reorganization, many new council standing committees became u
 established; in addition, the chairman gained the power to appoint >
 members to all standing committees."30 The 1971 reorganization also '
 radically revised the executive branch of Navajo government. Five
 0
 central offices that dealt with business management, operations, etc., N
 were each headed by a director appointed by MacDonald and serving u
 at his pleasure. Interestingly, this massing of political power in the ex- s 109
 ecutive branch and away from the legislative branch was approved by
 the council with little apparent dissent. ?
 MacDonald's second and third terms were, however, mired in
 controversy. The chairman was indicted in 1977 on charges of misman-
 agement of federal funds, and issues like apportionment, the Navajo-
 Hopi land dispute, the controversial creation of a supreme judicial
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 council in 1978, the tribal pension scheme in 1979, and MacDonald's
 support of Ronald Reagan for president in 1980 only intensified con-
 cern over the state of his administration of the Navajo government.3'
 Peterson Zah broke MacDonald's stranglehold on the chairman-
 ship in 1982. Zah emphasized a partnership policy with the tribal
 council, the Navajo people, and with the Hopi, local, state, and federal
 governments. He also had active economic development initiatives,
 pushed vigorously for the renegotiation of inequitable energy leases,
 and stressed the importance of education of Navajo youth. In fact, edu-
 cation was his first priority, and very quickly the Navajo Tribal Council
 adopted new educational policies for the tribe and reservation schools.32
 Reapportionment and tribal government reform, however, were
 two of the most important issues confronting the government. A new
 reapportionment plan was finally adopted on December 6, 1985. And
 in 1985 the Navajo Nation reorganized its court system through the
 Judicial Reform Act. This measure created the Navajo Supreme Court
 and revised the tribal court judge selection process.
 Despite the stability Zah brought to the Navajo Nation, when his
 term neared completion, MacDonald once again entered the picture. In
 an extremely close election, MacDonald had 30,746 votes (carried 54
 chapters) to Zah's 30,171 votes (carried 53 chapters); three chapters ac-
 tually tied in their votes for the two. MacDonald was returned to power
 and was sworn in on January 13, 1987. MacDonald's inaugural speech
 seemed to indicate a man who had mellowed somewhat. He empha-
 sized the need for jobs, talked about the importance of education, and,
 like Zah, stressed partnerships with the business community and the
 state governments. But he insisted that the Navajo people would con-
 tinue to hold the federal government accountable as their trustee.
 Very soon, however, developments began to spiral out of control.
 First was the suppression of freedom of the press with the closing of
 the tribe's newspaper, the Navajo Times Today, in February 1987. Second,
 a special session of the Navajo Tribal Council, called for April 1987,
 was killed because it lacked a quorum. The purpose of the session was
 to have been tribal government reform. Third, MacDonald convinced
 the tribal council to purchase the Big Boquillas Ranch just west of the
 Grand Canyon. It was this final issue, the Big Bo deal, that would be at
 the vortex of events that led to the 1989 riot in Window Rock in which
 several Navajos were killed or injured.
 110 i
 N D DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE NAVAJO
 ?c NATION: TITLE II AMENDMENTS,
 '"IQ 1989 TO PRESENT
 By 1989 it was evident that while theoretically the Navajo Nation had
 a three-branch government, the actual state of affairs revealed that the
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 executive branch, under MacDonald, was vastly superior to the legisla-
 tive branch and, in fact, dominated the law-making branch. MacDonald
 was chairman not of the Navajo Nation proper, but of the Navajo Tribal
 Council. The office of the chair had accumulated vast powers, dating
 back to the 1950s, an accumulation that grew tremendously under
 MacDonald's reign.
 The chairman by 1989 headed not only the executive branch,
 but also held legislative powers greater than those exercised by the
 Speaker of the House of Representatives and was also the principal
 representative of the tribe to the outside world. The chairman presided
 over all meetings of the tribal council, selected all standing committee
 chairs and members, including those of the powerful mini-council and
 the Advisory Committee (which he chaired) that had authority to act
 for the council when it was not in session. The Advisory Committee
 also was empowered to develop an agenda for the council and could
 recommend legislation. MacDonald also chaired the Intergovernmen-
 tal Relations Committee.
 The combination of this virtually unlimited executive power,
 combined with the ample evidence uncovered in U.S. Senate hearings
 from 1987 to 1989 of MacDonald's leading involvement in the tribe's
 controversial purchase of the 491,000-acre Big Bo Ranch, in which he
 was alleged to have accepted bribes and kickbacks from contractors,
 led to an intense struggle for power in Window Rock. By early spring
 1989, a majority of the tribal council had grown weary of these devel-
 opments and placed MacDonald on involuntary administrative leave
 pending the investigation of the allegations against him. Leonard Haskie
 was appointed as interim chairman.
 MacDonald and his supporters fought these actions over an
 eleven-week period, despite the fact that the Navajo Supreme Court
 had upheld the council's power to place a chairman on administrative
 leave. The conflict eventually escalated into a deadly confrontation
 that erupted in Window Rock on July 20, 1989, between MacDonald's
 supporters and the tribal council and the tribal police. Two Navajos 3
 died and ten others were injured in the fighting.33 >
 In the fall of 1989 and in later trials, MacDonald was tried and
 convicted on numerous counts of bribery, instigating a riot, fraud, A
 racketeering, ethics violations, extortion, and conspiracy. He was sen-
 tenced to fourteen years in a federal penitentiary. In December 1989, u
 the tribal council, urgently aware of the need to correct those structur- 311
 al problems in Navajo government that had fostered MacDonald's rise r
 and maintenance of power, set about the task of restructuring the rela-
 tionship between the executive and legislative branches.34
 On December 15, 1989, by a vote of 44 to 17 with 13 absten-
 tions, the Navajo Tribal Council enacted a landmark resolution, CD-
 68-89, entitled "Amending Title Two (2) of the Navajo Tribal Code
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 and Related Action." This law became operational April 11, 1990. The
 opening section declares:
 Whereas:
 1. Pursuant to 2 N.T.C., Section 101, the Navajo
 Tribal Council is the governing body of the Navajo
 Nation; and
 2. Recent controversy involving the leadership of
 the Navajo Nation has demonstrated that the present
 Navajo Nation Government structure allows too much
 centralized power without real checks on the exercise of
 power. Experience shows that this deficiency in the gov-
 ernment structure allows for, invites and has resulted in
 the abuse of power; and
 3. The Judicial Branch has been reorganized by the
 Judicial Reform Act of 1985 ... and treating the Judicial
 Branch as a separate branch of government has proven to
 be beneficial to the Navajo Nation and has provided sta-
 bility in the government; and
 4. The lack of definition of power and separation
 of legislative and executive functions have also allowed
 the legislative body to overly involve itself in administra-
 tion of programs thereby demonstrating a need to limit
 the legislative function to legislation and policy decision
 making and further limit the executive function to imple-
 mentation of laws and representation of the Navajo
 Nation; and
 5. There is an immediate need to reorganize the
 Navajo Nation government by defining the powers of the
 legislative and executive branches and impose limitations
 on exercise of such powers; and
 6. The number of standing committees of the
 Navajo Tribal Council has grown to eighteen (18) and
 some standing committees can be combined ... thereby
 reducing the number of standing committees to twelve
 %A (12) and to provide for a more efficient and responsive
 committee system; and
 ;<^ ~ 7. The reorganization of the Navajo Nation
 112 3 Government as proposed herein is intended to meet the
 immediate needs of the Navajo people for a more respon-
 sible and accountable government and will have no effect
 on the long term Government Reform Project which will
 proceed as authorized and directed by the Navajo Tribal
 Council; and
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 8. It is in the best interest of the Navajo Nation that
 the Navajo Nation Government be reorganized to provide
 for separation of functions into three branches, and pro-
 vide for checks and balances between the three branches
 until the Navajo People decide through the Government
 Reform Project the form of government they want to be
 governed by.35
 In effect, a number of impressive changes were implemented as a result
 of this resolution:
 * Formal separation of powers between the executive and
 legislative branches.
 * Diluted the power of the chief executive by creating the
 office of Navajo Nation president and vice-president
 who now served as the nation's chief executive officer.
 The president no longer served as head of the legisla-
 tive branch.
 * Created a speaker of the council position. This indi-
 vidual presides over the council's deliberations.
 * Defined and set limits on the powers of the executive
 and legislative branches.
 * Reduced the number of standing committees from eigh-
 teen to twelve.
 * The power to appoint the membership of the legislative
 committees was taken from the chairman/president and
 given to the speaker of the council, subject to confirma-
 tion by the council.
 Despite these important and much needed reforms (see Fig-
 ure 1 for a representation of the current government structure), the
 Navajo people still were not given the opportunity to have any input
 into these changes, and the Title Two Amendments have not yet ,
 been taken before the Navajo electorate for their approval. In effect, >
 even as the Navajo Nation government becomes more democrat-
 ic, these changes lack fundamental political legitimacy because the
 0
 Navajo people have yet to sanction the government's existence in a ?
 formal manner. Nevertheless, under the Title II Amendments, three u
 Navajo presidents have so far been popularly elected (Zah in 1990, 3 113
 Albert Hale in 1994, and Kelsey Begaye in 1998), although both Hale
 and his immediate successor, Thomas Atcitty, were forced out of of- ?
 fice for ethical improprieties. Still, the fact that they left office in a
 peaceful fashion is a testimony to the stability of the current struc-
 ture of government.
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 NAVAJO NATION
 THREE-BRANCH GOVERNMENT
 EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
 BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH




 * Navajo Nation Washington
 Office
 * Navajo/Hopi Land
 Commission
 * Office of Navajo Tax
 Commission
 * Office of Attorney General
 * Office of Management and
 Budget
 * Division of Finance
 * Division of Public Safety
 * Division of Human
 Resources
 * Division of General Services
 * Division of Education
 * Division of Health Services
 * Division of Social Services
 * Division of Community
 Development
 * Division of Economic
 Development
 Office of the Navajo Nat on
 Speaker
 * 88 Council Delegates
 * Intergovernmental
 Relations Committee
 * Navajo Nation Council
 Standing Committees
 * Boards and Commission
 Legislative Offices
 * Office of Legislative
 Services
 * Office of Legislative
 Counsel
 * Office of Auditor General
 * Office of Ethics and Rules
 * Navajo Election
 Administration
 * Navajo Labor Commission
 * Navajo Government
 Development
 * Office of Miss Navajo
 Nation
 * Community Services
 Program
 * Legislative Personnel
 * Northern Navajo Agency
 Program
 * Agency Network Program
 Local Chapter Governments
 110 Navajo Nation Chapters
 Navajo Nation
 Supreme Court
 * Office of the Chief Justice
 * Two Associate Justices
 District Courts
 * Chinle District Court
 * Crownpoint District Court
 * Kayenta District Court
 * Ramah District Court
 * Shiprock District Court
 * Tuba City District Court







 * Tuba City
 * Window Rock
 * Shiprock
 * Peacemaker Courts
 In December 1989, the Navajo Nation Council enacted Resolution CJA-72-89, which codified the sepa-
 ration of powers between the three branches.
 Source: Office of Navajo Government Development. Navajo Nation Government Booklet (Window
 Rock, Arizona: Office of Navajo Government Development, 1997), 18.
 Figure 1. Three-branch government of the Navajo Nation
 A DINf POLICY PORTFOLIO
 The Navajo Nation government, like all indigenous and nonindige-
 nous governments, is confronted by a battery of critical issues that
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 Navajo Nation's relationship with the federal government; the nation's
 struggle with democratization; and the political corruption scandals of
 Chairman Peter MacDonald, which led to the latest surge of demo-
 cratic reforms. But even this surge has not yet led to the ultimate step
 in the process of democratization-when the Navajo policy makers
 concede that the Navajo people are the legitimate fount of Navajo
 sovereignty.
 I will describe and discuss three of the ongoing public policies of
 importance to the Navajo government-land disputes, gaming, and
 taxation. Suffice it to say, there are many others, and entire texts could
 be written about each of these. For example, a quick review of just the
 most recent Navajo president's annual reports reveals discussion, com-
 mentary, and concern about issues such as the rising tide of juvenile
 crime, concerns about the quality and quantity of water, matters relat-
 ing to Navajo education, the relationship of the nation to the states
 and the federal government, eastern Navajo land consolidation, taxa-
 tion matters, lack of quality housing, ongoing disputes-both land and
 religious-with the Hopi Nation and the San Juan Band of Southern
 Paiute, the rights of off-reservation Navajos, health care, economic de-
 velopment, environmental issues around deforestation, coal and urani-
 um extraction, etc., special problems of Navajo veterans, and concerns
 about retention and application of traditional Navajo culture and phi-
 losophy. I have chosen to focus on three particular topics. The first, the
 Navajo-Hopi land disputes, entails past, present, and future intertribal
 possibilities. The second, Indian gaming, is a potential issue of great
 economic and moral importance. The third, taxation, also has impor-
 tant economic connotations, but also indicates that the nation has
 evolved as a government into a more self-determined entity.
 NAVAJO/HOPI LAND DISPUTES
 Of the many issues confronting the Navajo government, this may easi-
 ly be the one most recognized by parties inside and outside the nation.
 The disputes arise from an exceedingly complicated set of situations
 with roots dating back to at least 1882, if not before. The land tension
 involves not only the two tribal governments (and their legal staffs) but
 many other parties who have been involved over the years, including
 various agencies of the federal government, state governments, corpo-
 rate interests, individual ranchers and landowners, cities, and two other 3 115
 little discussed tribes-the San Juan Band of Southern Paiute and the
 Zuni Indians of New Mexico.
 The conflicts have spawned countless federal and state lawsuits,
 several congressional laws, many tribal resolutions, a new federal agency
 (the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission), and needless to say, heart-
 break on the part of those Navajo and Hopi (over nine thousand Navajo
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 and one hundred Hopi) who were required by federal law to relocate.
 The relocation of members of both tribes constituted the largest re-
 location (forced for some, voluntary for others) of any racial/ethnic
 group since the Japanese-American relocations during World War II. It
 is also the most expensive Indian relocation, costing at least $330 mil-
 lion by 1997. A wealth of literature36 has also been generated by the
 conflicts between the tribes and others, though the reader is cautioned
 to read material presented from both tribes' perspectives before draw-
 ing any conclusions.
 Background of the Disputes
 Briefly, the issue is this. After the Navajo Reservation was created in
 1868, a later Hopi Reservation, located southwest of the Navajo Reser-
 vation, was established in 1882 through an executive order issued by
 President Chester A. Arthur. This order set aside 2.5 million acres for
 the Hopi and "such other Indians" the Secretary of the Interior might
 see fit to settle there. As the Navajo population expanded, and with it
 their land base, gradually the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation
 came to engulf the Hopi Reservation, and Navajo people settled with-
 in the 1882 executive-order Hopi Reservation lands.
 Even as this land conflict began to loom, another arose in 1934
 when Congress added about 234,000 acres of land to the Navajo Res-
 ervation in the Western Agency. This acreage, just east of Tuba City,
 happened to include the Hopi nation's westernmost village, Moencopi.
 This time the language of the congressional act was the reverse of the
 1882 executive order. The law stated that the land was for the benefit
 of Navajos and "such other Indians as are already settled thereon." The
 Hopi, however, claimed the entire area as compensation for Navajo
 occupancy elsewhere within the 1882 Hopi Reservation.37
 This formed the basis of what would become known as the
 Bennett Freeze area, named after CIA Robert Bennett, who in 1966, at
 the urging of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, placed severe
 > limitations on construction and development in the 1934 disputed
 lands. Any future development would require the consent of both
 tribes and all revenue from the land would go into a special account to
 be held until the respective rights of both tribes could be determined.
 The construction freeze has left an indelible mark on the over
 116 seven hundred families living in the contested area. Although original-
 ly developed as "a means of encouraging negotiation over an age-old
 dispute ... the Bennett Freeze gradually developed into an intrusive
 and burdensome policy ... forcing [the Indians] to live in poverty by
 denying them the right to enlarge, to maintain, and even to repair their
 homes."38
 The construction ban was temporarily lifted in 1992 by federal
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 judge Earl Carroll. It was reinstated before it was again lifted in 1996
 after the two tribes reached an agreement. However, the freeze re-
 mained on some 700,000 acres the Hopi Nation claims. Congress
 got involved when Representative John D. Hayworth introduced H.R.
 104 on January 6, 2001, which would legislatively repeal the Bennett
 Freeze, ending what Hayworth called "a gross treaty violation with the
 Navajo Nation." As of this writing (fall 2001), this bill had not been
 enacted.
 The land problems between the two tribal nations festered
 throughout the middle part of the twentieth century. Delicate negotia-
 tions between the tribal councils and their attorneys failed, and a court
 settlement, which called for joint use and occupancy by the two tribes,
 also failed to resolve the profound differences between the Navajo and
 Hopi governments. The Hopi, for their part, demanded a partition of
 the 1882 reservation that would clarify and affirm their land rights.
 The Navajo Nation, for its part, wanted its members to be able to re-
 main where they were in the disputed area and preferred buying out
 the Hopi Nation's interests.
 Congress responded in 1974 with P.L. 93-541,39 which provided
 for partition-a fifty-fifty division of the 1.8 million acres of land-
 between the two tribes. An independent, temporary relocation com-
 mission was established by the law to oversee the relocation of the af-
 fected tribal members who, after land division, were found to be on the
 "wrong side of the line." Houses and relocation expenses were to be
 provided by the federal government. Relocation was scheduled to be
 completed by 1986.
 Human conflicts like this that include issues of property rights
 (land, livestock, water, coal), religious freedom concerns (access to sa-
 cred shrines and eagle gathering areas and use of eagle parts), corpo-
 rate involvement, and the psychological, emotional, and formal dis-
 ruptions and violence they generate, rarely conform to governmental
 timetables. Although the vast majority of Navajos and all Hopis have
 been relocated, the process, as of 2001, is not yet complete. The in-
 completion stems from the persistent resistance of some two to three
 hundred Navajos (the figures vary) who refuse to leave the lands they
 feel culturally and religiously connected to: lands that the Hopi Nation
 has legally owned since 1882 and has been spiritually and culturally
 linked with for many more centuries.
 The fierce resistance of this group of Navajo led Congress in the 3 117
 fall of 1996 to enact yet another law, P.L. 104-301, the Navajo-Hopi
 Land Dispute Settlement Act, which implemented the Accommodation
 Agreement that had been worked out over the previous five years. The
 Land Dispute Act ratified the settlement of four claims of the Hopi
 nation against the federal government and provided the necessary au-
 thority for the Hopi to exercise jurisdiction over their lands by issuing
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 seventy-five-year lease agreements to the Navajos still residing on
 Hopi-partitioned lands. The Hopi are to be paid $50 million by the
 United States for lost rents and to enable the tribe to buy new lands.40
 The Navajo Nation Council had already enacted resolutions in
 1994 and 1995 that opposed the Accommodation Agreement in its
 original form because, according to the nation, it did not protect the
 religious rights of the Navajo residents. While morally opposed to re-
 location, then president Albert Hale noted in a speech on February 1,
 1997, that changes in the Accommodation Agreement, implemented
 with the passage of Public Law 104-301 in 1996, spearheaded by the
 Navajo residents themselves, guaranteed them religious protection. As
 such, he declared that "this agreement represents the only remaining
 means to establish their legal basis for continued residency on Hopi
 Partitioned Lands. Will they accept what their fellow Navajo neigh-
 bors have negotiated? I submit to all my people: the Navajo Hopi
 Partition Lands residents should sign the Accommodation Agreement."
 The council, however, in a special session later in February, re-
 affirmed its earlier resolution "opposing the Accommodation Agree-
 ment in its present form" and recommended an extension of the
 March 31, 1997, deadline. The council also expressed "adamant oppo-
 sition" to forced eviction of Navajos.41 Navajo residents were given
 until March 31, 1997, to sign the seventy-five-year leases (renewable
 for another seventy-five years) with the Hopi Nation, although the
 ones who refused to sign were not evicted immediately. If they agreed
 to relocate, the federal government was required under the 1996 law to
 pay for their moving expenses and build them a home, a process that
 takes anywhere from six months to more than a year.
 NAVAJOS AND TRIBALLY SPONSORED
 GAMBLING (GAMING)
 Since the 1980s, many tribal governments have introduced legalized
 gambling as a means to generate revenue to offset dramatically de-
 > creased federal funding and to develop their own economic base. In
 fact, tribes were encouraged by the Reagan administration to pursue
 tribally owned Indian gambling enterprises as one means of counter-
 balancing the severe cuts in federal expenditures his administration
 had implemented. After an important Supreme Court decision in 1987,
 118 I California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,42 which held that states could
 not enforce their civil/regulatory gaming laws to prohibit gaming on
 Indian lands, Congress stepped forward the following year and enact-
 ed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).43
 This act had three broad goals: to promote tribal economic de-
 velopment, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government; to provide a
 regulatory base to protect Indian gaming from organized crime; and to
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 establish a National Indian Gaming Commission. The act separated
 Indian gaming into three classes. Class I was strictly social gambling
 and solely under tribal jurisdiction. Class II included bingo, pull tabs,
 etc. This type was subject to tribal jurisdiction, with federal oversight.
 It also had to be legal under existing state law. Class III, potentially the
 most lucrative, included keno, lottery, pari-mutuel, slot machines, casi-
 no games, and banking card games. This class required a tribal ordi-
 nance, permission from the Indian Gaming Commission, and the state
 had to permit the activity. In fact, tribes were required to conduct Class
 III gaming in conformance with a tribal-state compact. If a state, such
 as Utah, did not allow Class III gaming, then tribes were denied the
 chance to engage in it.
 States were required under the act to make a "good faith" effort
 to negotiate a tribal-state compact with those tribes who wanted to
 pursue these gaming ventures. The act authorized a tribe to bring suit
 in federal court against a state in order to force performance of that
 duty if the state refused to act in good faith and in good time to work
 out a compact. This final provision, however, was changed when the
 Supreme Court ruled in Seminole Tribe of Indians v. Florida44 in 1996 that
 the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevents Congress from
 authorizing suits by tribes against states absent state consent.
 In fact, the IGRA gave states a voice, for the first time, over inter-
 nal economic issues that previously were left solely to the discretion of
 the tribes and their trustee, the federal government. The requirement
 that tribes have to negotiate a compact with a state for Class III gaming
 operations, in effect, provided state officials with powerful leverage
 over a tribal nation's internal economic decisions.
 States, with only a few exceptions (e.g., General Allotment Act
 of 1887, Public Law 280 of 1953, terminated tribes), have rarely had
 any direct say, much less veto power, over internal tribal decisions.
 Several reasons account for this. First, the doctrine of tribal sovereign-
 ty recognizes the right of tribal nations to manage their own affairs
 without state interference. Second, the nation-to-nation treaty rela-
 tionship that states were precluded from participating in provides >
 tribes a measure of protection from state intrusion. And third, many
 western states-including Arizona and New Mexico-were required '
 to insert "disclaimer" clauses in their constitutions in which they as-
 sured the federal government that they would never attempt to inter-
 fere in tribal affairs and would never attempt to tax Indian trust lands. ? 119
 Despite this wealth of protection, however, the ideology of states' rights
 activism has grown tremendously in the last ten years, and Congress
 and the Supreme Court are more often siding with states when they are
 competing with tribes.
 For some tribes, such as the Mashantucket Pequot of Connecti-
 cut, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians of California, or the Ak-Chin
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 Community of Arizona, Indian gaming, as the business has come to be
 called, has brought billions of dollars, provided jobs for tribal mem-
 bers, and generally enabled the successful tribes to attain a level of eco-
 nomic self-sufficiency they had not enjoyed since before the days of
 European colonialism. Indian gaming has generated jobs, revenues, and
 other economic benefits to local and state economies as well.
 For other tribes, however, such as the Mohawk and Oneida of
 New York, while gaming has generated significant revenue, it has also
 led to severe intratribal tension, sometimes leading to violence, and
 has produced other negative social consequences as well. More impor-
 tant, it has generated a severe backlash in many state governments and
 among more established gambling interests in Las Vegas and New
 Jersey. States and the players in Vegas and Jersey are envious of the
 riches-both actual and perceived-that tribes are enjoying. The back-
 lash has worked its way into Congress where bills are pending that
 would reduce the tribes' gaming options, and into the Supreme Court
 where recent decisions have restricted the sovereignty of tribes while
 uplifting the sovereign powers of states.45
 As of 2001, 196 of the 561 tribal entities were operating 309
 gaming facilities in twenty-eight states. In Arizona alone, 17 tribal
 nations have gaming operations, including Cocopah, Fort McDowell
 Mohave-Apache, Gila River, Hualapai, San Carlos and White Mountain
 Apache, the Pascua Yaqui, etc. The Fort McDowell tribe, for example,
 in 1993 announced profits of $41 million, which was split thus: $12.3
 million for tribal government operations; $15.6 for economic develop-
 ment; $2 million for community welfare; $410,000 for contracts with
 local governments; $410,000 for local charity; and $10.3 million for
 per capita (individual) payments to tribal members-averaging about
 $12,000 per person.46 The only tribes in Arizona that do not have gam-
 ing as of 2001 are the Havasupai, Hopi, San Juan Southern Paiute, and
 the Navajo Nation.47
 3 Navajos Reject Gaming
 ' Historically, Navajos, like most social groups, enjoyed a number of in-
 formal gambling rituals. For example, the shoe game is still very popu-
 lar, and certainly gambling was done on horse and foot races. Card
 u games were and still are played quite frequently at squaw dances and
 120 3 other gatherings.48 This type of gambling is very different from the
 N type of state or tribally sanctioned gaming that is backed by the force
 ? of law and is designed to generate revenue for governmental purposes.
 From a governmental perspective, the Navajo Nation passed a reso-
 0 lution in 1977 that criminalized gambling if the person engaging in
 it "intends to derive an economic benefit other than personal win-
 nings" from the endeavor. However, seemingly in anticipation of tribal-
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 sponsored gambling, this law was amended in 1993 by providing an
 "exception" to the offense section. Resolution CN-81-93 declared that
 "it shall not be unlawful for any person to engage in the activities con-
 stituting this offense if done as part of an economic initiative of the
 Navajo Nation Government, or as a gaming licensee of the Navajo
 Nation Government."49 In a footnote to this law, it was stated that
 the effective date of this amendment was "subject to enactments of a
 comprehensive statutory scheme to control gaming within the Navajo
 Nation by the Navajo Nation Council."
 Despite the council's optimism, however, and with so many tribes
 having already ventured into gaming as a prime economic genera-
 tor, why has the Navajo Nation not joined in the process? More specifi-
 cally, why has the Navajo Nation electorate, in two separate tribal
 referenda-1994 and 1997-explicitly rejected the establishment of
 Indian gaming within the reservation?
 According to research conducted by Henderson and Russell, the
 Navajo people rejected the gaming referendum in November 1994 by
 a vote of 23,450 to 23,073 largely because of moral concerns. It ap-
 pears that these concerns outweighed the perceived potential for reve-
 nue because "unlike other tribal casinos which generally attract pre-
 dominantly non-Indian patrons, the proposed casinos in the Navajo
 Nation would be patronized by large numbers of Navajos."50 Not easi-
 ly dissuaded, the council pushed forward and in 1997 authorized yet
 another national referendum by Resolution CAP-26-97 during the spring
 session. Once again, Navajos rejected the measure. While no scientific
 research has been done on the second referendum, in all likelihood
 the Navajo turned away from gaming for reasons similar to those in
 1994-concern about the social welfare of tribal members. As Richie
 Nez, executive director of the Navajo Election Administration put it:
 "No matter how you educate people, especially the older people, they
 still associate gambling with alcoholism, and all other vices ... They
 just don't see any good coming out of it."51
 This issue pits the general social and moral concerns of the
 Navajo electorate against the financial and economic concerns of a ma-
 jority of those in the government who believe that the nation is losing
 out on millions of dollars and thousands of permanent jobs. Gaming is
 an issue that promises to be revisited yet again in the future by the
 council and by the nation.
 An interesting question is, why has the council twice placed this 121
 issue before the people using the referendum process, yet refused to
 put the question of a tribal constitution, or one of the proposed alter-
 native government ideas, or even the Title II amendments before the
 people for their consideration? Certainly, economic considerations are
 vitally important to the nation as their nonrenewable natural resource
 endowment (especially coal, gas, etc.) continues to decline, which
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 directly reduces the revenues coming into the tribal treasury. But the
 question of governmental legitimacy, from the standpoint of what con-
 stitutes the actual basis of tribal sovereignty, is, one could argue, even
 more vital to the character of the nation.
 TAXATION AND THE NAVAJO NATION
 Euro-Americans and taxes have coexisted uncomfortably since the be-
 ginning of the American republic. "Taxation without representation,"
 after all, was one of the catalysts sparking the American Revolution,
 since American colonists resented the idea of being forced to pay taxes
 to a distant government, Great Britain, that they had no actual repre-
 sentation in. Americans then and now, including Indian peoples, knew,
 as Chief Justice John Marshall stated in McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819,
 that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." Furthermore,
 anyone holding a job is aware, because of hefty tax deductions, of the
 truthfulness of the famous expression: "In this world nothing can be
 said to be certain, except death and taxes."
 But taxes are also the lifeblood of most non-Indian governments
 and are becoming increasingly important to tribal governments as
 well. Taxes raise the revenues required to hire employees, provide es-
 sential services (libraries, roads, schools, etc.), and conduct govern-
 ment affairs. Of course, taxation, like many issues we have been dis-
 cussing, touches Indian lives and reservation lands in a different way
 than it touches other Americans. For example, the U.S. Constitution,
 in the section describing how U.S. representatives were to be elected
 to Congress, required each state, when it counted its citizens for pur-
 poses of congressional apportionment, to exclude "Indians not taxed."
 This same expression is also found in section 2 of the Fourteenth
 Amendment, which was ratified and proclaimed in 1866. This expres-
 sion was included because Indians were not citizens of the United
 States when the Constitution was drafted, and most had still not been
 enfranchised as late as the 1860s when the Fourteenth Amendment was
 > ratified. Indians remained citizens of their own sovereign nations.
 Ug The passage of several laws, including the 1924 Indian Citizen-
 ship Act, altered the status of individual Indians vis-a-vis federal taxes.
 And after some court cases in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, it was de-
 termined by the federal government that individual Indians, as citizens
 122 of the United States, were indeed required to pay federal income taxes
 unless a treaty or statute exempted them.52
 Tribal governments, however, as sovereign entities, are generally
 exempt from paying most federal taxes and nearly all state taxes. In fact,
 the Internal Revenue Service has determined specifically that tribes are
 exempt from federal income taxes. But the immunity from some taxa-
 tion that tribes have is not nearly as secure as the immunity states enjoy
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 from federal taxation. Tribes periodically face concerted attempts by
 certain state and federal legislators to require them to pay taxes, not-
 withstanding tribal sovereign status. States do not face such taxation
 assaults by the federal government.
 The Power of the Navajo Nation to Tax
 Until the 1970s, the Navajo Nation did not collect taxes to finance its
 operations, although as we have shown, the nation was clearly entitled
 to collect taxes. Ironically, while the nation was not collecting taxes,
 state governments were using their taxing authority and were earning
 sizable sums of money by taxing certain businesses operating within
 Navajo lands. In fact, in a study done by Michael Benson in 1975, he
 learned that besides paying applicable federal taxes, Navajos were
 also paying taxes to support the state governments of Arizona, New
 Mexico, and Utah. They were also contributing to six county govern-
 ments in those three states-Apache, Coconino, and Navajo in Arizona;
 Mckinley and San Juan in New Mexico, and San Juan in Utah. Benson
 further noted that:
 State and county governments collect taxes on property
 located in the Navajo Nation and on income derived from
 activities in the Navajo Nation. They directly tax the in-
 comes and property of non-Navajos who live, work or
 conduct business in the Navajo Nation. They collect a lot
 of taxes "indirectly" from Navajos and non-Navajos by
 taxing wholesalers who supply Navajo Nation retailers
 with such commodities as gasoline and cigarettes.53
 What was particularly frustrating, as this report showed, was that
 non-Navajo governments were receiving far more money in taxes from
 the development of Navajo Nation resources than the Navajo Nation
 was securing in income from royalties and lease arrangements from
 those same resources. For example, in 1972 the Navajo Nation re- >
 ceived $1.4 million in royalties for the coal that was used at the Four
 Corners Power Plant. By contrast, the state, county, and local govern-
 ments were earning $7.2 million from taxes on that same coal.54 ?
 As a result of this kind of disparity, and with the growing realiza- u
 tion that the nation's mineral resources were not inexhaustible, the : 123
 Navajo government in 1974 enacted a resolution establishing a Navajo
 Tax Commission. The MacDonald administration was slow in getting
 the commission started, but it was eventually set up and began the pro-
 cess of devising a taxation program to correct the evident taxation in-
 equities. The commission's work led to two tribally approved tax ordi-
 nances in 1984: a Possessory Interest Tax and a Business Activity Tax.
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 The taxes were immediately challenged by individuals and companies
 subject to them, although, as noted earlier, one of the inherent powers
 of any sovereign is the power to tax. Tribal governments, therefore,
 have the legal right to tax their citizens, noncitizens, and businesses
 and corporations doing business within their lands. As the Supreme
 Court said in 1982 in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe:
 The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sov-
 ereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-
 government and territorial management. This power en-
 ables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential
 services. The power does not derive solely from the Indian
 tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. In-
 stead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sov-
 ereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction,
 and to defray the cost of providing governmental services
 by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises en-
 gaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.55
 Notwithstanding this important decision, the Navajo Nation
 taxes continued to be challenged by companies like the Kerr-McGee
 Corporation. Ultimately, in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled in Kerr-
 McGee Corporation v. The Navajo Tribe56 that the nation possessed the sov-
 ereign power to enact and impose tax laws without approval by the
 Interior Department.57
 The Possessory Interest Tax (PIT) requires any owner of a lease
 granted by the Navajos to pay an annual tax on the value of the lease
 site and natural resources thereunder at a rate of between 1 and 10 per-
 cent. The Business Activity Tax (BAT) requires anyone who is engaged
 in production activities on the reservation to pay a tax on the gross
 receipt from such activities at a rate of between 4 and 8 percent. Both
 ordinances have been amended several times, and other taxes have
 since been enacted as well.
 > In 1985 the council established an Oil and Gas Severance Tax, a
 tax imposed on the severance of, producing, or taking from the soil
 products within the nation at the rate of between 3 and 8 percent. In
 addition, in 1992 the council created a Hotel Occupancy Tax that "im-
 u posed on a person who, under a lease, concession, permit ... pays for
 124 3 the use or possession or for the right to the use or possession of a room
 or space in a hotel costing $2 or more each day." The tax rate initially
 ? was 5 percent, but in 1994 it was increased to 8 percent. This tax
 was also challenged by non-Indians. In May 2001, in a landmark ruling
 that dramatically infringed on Navajo (and by extension other tribal
 nations) sovereignty, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley (531 U.S. 645), the
 U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that since the Navajo's Hotel
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Occupancy Tax had not been authorized via treaty or congressional
 statute, and since it fell upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land-
 even though the business was operated within the borders of the
 reservation-the Navajo Nation could not lawfully impose the tax.
 The council, in 1995, instituted two new measures to generate
 revenue for the tribal coffers: a Tobacco Products Tax and Licensing Act
 (a 40 cents per pack tax is assessed on tobacco sales) and a Fuel Dis-
 tributors Licensing Act (taxing any person or business delivering fuel
 on the reservation). The Tax Commission is also in the early stages of
 discussing the need for a Gross Receipts Tax, which if ever enacted
 would impose on the gross receipts of any person engaged in trade,
 commerce, manufacture, power production, or any other productive
 activity a tax at a heretofore unspecified rate. This tax would exempt
 the sale of gasoline, church-sponsored activities, prescription drugs,
 wages, food stamps, etc.58
 These taxes and license fees generate an average of $30 million a
 year for tribal government operations, although this figure will be re-
 duced in the wake of the Atkinson ruling. The BAT brings in $15 million;
 the PIT $10 million; the Oil and Gas Severance Tax about $4 million;
 the Hotel Occupancy Tax about $1 million. The remainder comes in
 from the tobacco and fuel taxes.59
 Importantly, the taxes are imposed on Navajo citizens as well as
 particular non-Navajo business activities, although the Navajo Nation
 itself is exempt from being taxed. As the amount of nonrenewable re-
 sources continues to decrease, taxation and the revenues it produces
 will become even more important to the nation's economy.
 CONCLUSION
 If this sampling of policy issues is any indication of what the future
 holds for the Navajo Nation government, then it is clear that the
 Navajo people and their elected and appointed representatives face a
 future, as they did a past and present, that is full of both promise and
 tension. Promise because, as we have seen, the Dine people are particu- >
 larly adept at finding creative ways of taking care of themselves, their
 resources, and managing their affairs with others. Tension, however,
 because internal conflicts, a gradually diminishing pool of natural re-
 sources, and the inconsistent nature of Navajo political relations with
 counties, states, and the federal government mean that consistent har- P 125
 mony is not likely. This is understandable. But the continuing move to-
 ward full democracy, which intensified with the Title II Amendments
 of 1989, means that the nation is heading in a positive direction.
 Of course, the Navajo people have still not had nor have they
 taken the opportunity via a referendum/initiative to express their col-
 lective will about what shape Dine democracy should be like, and this
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 must be rectified. But even after this is accomplished, assuming that
 it will be, everything will not be settled. Democracies, no matter their
 location, are not perfect governments. It is up to successive Navajo
 generations to nurture and strengthen the foundation of Navajo
 government.
 Perhaps former Chief Justice Tom Tso put it best when asked by
 a reporter as he neared retirement what he thought his primary con-
 tributions to the Navajo court system had been. Tso responded by
 saying:
 I don't know if I've done anything extraordinary. Basically,
 I did my job, which was to hear and to cite cases-giving
 everybody a fair shake. I've tried to be very fair about the
 procedures and to make decisions based on the facts and
 the laws. I guess what I am trying to say is, that during all
 of my years on the bench, I just tried to do what a judge
 should be doing. There is no significant magic. I've had a
 lot of resources and a lot of cooperation from the leader-
 ship and the staff and we just did our jobs. We tried to look
 to Navajo customs, tradition and culture, and we found
 that many of our decisions and laws were influenced by
 those traditions.60
 This statement by a highly respected Navajo jurist exemplifies the
 strength, hindsight, and foresight of the Dine spirit that entails coop-
 erative living; respect for tradition, culture, and language; a focus on
 fairness and integrity; and the pursuit of justice.
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 no. 4 (1997): 518.
 5 Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry,
 and Jerry Goldman, The Challenge
 of Democracy: Government in America,
 brief ed., 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton
 Mifflin, 1998), 128-29.
 6 Marley Shebala, "Back to the
 Drawing Board," Navajo Times,
 September 7, 2000, Al.
 7 Author has a copy of this policy
 accord.
 8 See James W. Zion, Navajo Peace-
 maker Court Manual (Window Rock,
 Ariz.: Navajo Nation, 1982); Tom
 Tso, "The Process of Decision
 Making in Tribal Courts," Arizona
 Law Review: Indian Law Symposium
 31, no. 2 (1989): 225-35; and
 Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from
 It: Navajo Justice Concepts," New
 Mexico Law Review: Indian Law
 Symposium 24, no. 2 (spring 1994):
 175-90.
 9 See Tom Tso, "Moral Principles,
 Traditions, and Fairness in the
 Navajo Nation Code of Judicial
 Conduct," Judicature 76, no. 1
 (June-July 1992): 15-21.
 10 Wilson and John J. Dilulio Jr.,
 American Government: Institutions and
 Politics, 8th ed. (Boston: Houghton
 Mifflin, 2001), 14.
 11 Hast6i were considered wise el-
 ders. Hataali were medicine men
 or singers.
 12 W. W. Hill, "Some Aspects of
 Navajo Political Structure," Plateau
 13, no. 2 (October 1940): 24.
 13 Ibid.
 14 J. Lee Correll, comp., Through White
 Men's Eyes: A Contribution to Navajo
 History (Window Rock, AZ: Ari-
 zona Bicentennial Commission,
 1976), 146.
 15 Richard Van Valkenburgh, "Navajo
 Government," American Quarterly 4
 (winter 1945): 68.
 16 Bill P. Acrey, Navajo History to 1846:
 The Land and the People (Shiprock,
 N.M.: Department of Curriculum
 Mater als Development, 1982),
 114. And see J. Lee Correll's ac-
 count of Antonio Sandoval, an-
 other of the so-called Enemy
 Navajo in "Sandoval: Traitor or
 Patriot?" Navajo Historical Publi-
 cations, Biographical Series, no. 1
 (Window Rock, Ariz.: Navajo
 Tribal Printing Department, 1970).
 17 Robert W. Young, A Political History
 of the Navajo Tribe (Tsaile, Ariz.:
 Navajo Community College Press,
 1978), 43.
 18 Robert W. Young, "The Rise of
 the Navajo Tribe," in Edward
 Spicer and Raymond Thompson,
 eds., Plural Society in the Southwest
 (Albuquerque: University of New
 Mexico Press, 1972), 184.
 19 Ibid., 191.
 20 Richard White, The Roots of Depen-
 dency: Subsistence, Environment, and
 Social Change among the Choctaws,
 Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: Uni-
 versity of Nebraska Press, 1983),
 253.
 21 Ibid., 248.
 22 Tom Dodge had resigned in May
 and accepted employment with
 the BIA.
 23 Young, "The Rise of the Navajo
 Tribe," 203-5.
 24 Ibid.
 25 Ibid., 208.
 26 Ibid., 211.
 27 Peter Iverson, The Navajo Nation
 (Albuquerque: University of New
 Mexico Press, 1983), 68.
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 29 Ibid., 224.
 30 Iverson, The Navajo Nation, 175.
 31 See ibid. for a relatively unbiased
 look at these issues, and consult
 Iverson's article entitled "Peter
 MacDonald," in R. David Edmunds,
 ed., American Indian Leaders: Studies
 in Diversity (Lincoln: University of
 Nebraska Press, 1980), 222-41.
 And see Sandy Tolan's "Showdown
 at Window Rock" (New York Times
 Magazine, November 26, 1989, 28,
 30-31, 36-40, 74-75) for a more
 critical, if abbreviated, examination
 of MacDonald's tenure. But see
 Peter MacDonald's autobiography,
 The Last Warrior: Peter MacDonald
 and the Navajo Nation, written with
 Ted Schwarz (New York: Orion
 Books, 1993), for a decidedly and
 not surprisingly pro-MacDonald
 perspective on these and other is-
 sues related to MacDonald's tenure.
 32 See George M. Lubick, "Peterson
 Zah: A Progressive Outlook and
 a Traditional Style" (in John R.
 Wunder, ed., Native American
 Sovereignty [New York: Garland
 Publishing Company, 1996],
 241-66), for a good overview of
 Zah's first term as chair.
 33 See U.S. Senate, "Final Report: A
 Report of the Special Committee
 on Investigations of the Select
 Committee on Indian Affairs,"
 101st Cong., Istsess., 1989, S.
 Rept. 101-216, which contains a
 chapter on the Peter MacDonald
 corruption scandal. And see Sandy
 Tolan, "Showdown at Window
 Rock" (New York Times Magazine,
 November 26, 1989), for a good
 summary of the events leading
 to the violence. Also consult the
 Navajo Times Today for articles
 about these events.
 34 Michael Lieder, "Navajo Dispute
 Resolution and Promissory Ob-
 ligations: Continuity and Chal-
 lenge in the Largest Native Ameri-
 can Nation," American Indian Law
 Review 18, no. 1 (1993): 33-71.
 35 This was a Class C resolution and
 did not require BIA approval.
 36 See, e.g., Jerry Kammer, The Second
 Long Walk: The Navajo-Hopi Land
 Dispute (Albuquerque: University
 of New Mexico Press, 1980);
 David M. Brugge, The Navajo-Hopi
 Land Dispute: An American Tragedy
 (Albuquerque: University of New
 Mexico Press, 1994); Emily
 Benedek, The Wind Won't Know Me:
 A History of the Navajo-Hopi Land
 Dispute (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
 1992); and Maureen Trudelle
 Schwarz, "Unraveling the Anchor-
 ing Cord: Navajo Relocation,
 1974 to 1996," American Anthro-
 pologist 99, no. 1 (March 1997):
 43-55. See also Hollis A. Whitson,
 "A Policy Review of the Federal
 Government's Relocation of
 Navajo Indians under P.L. 93-531
 and P.L. 96-305," Arizona Law
 Review 27 (1985), for a dated but
 fairly objective account of the
 policy implications of this conflict.
 And see Catherine Feher-Elston,
 Children of Sacred Ground (Flagstaff,
 Ariz.: Northland Publishing
 Company, 1988).
 37 Iverson, The Navajo Nation, 195.
 38 John D. Moore, "Justice Too Long
 Delayed on the Navajo Reserva-
 tion: The 'Bennett Freeze' as a Case
 Study in Government Treatment
 of Native Americans," Harvard
 Human Rights Journal 6 (spring
 1993): 222-29.
 39 88 Stat. 1714.
 40 U.S. Congress, "Providing for the
 Settlement of the Navajo-Hopi
 Land Dispute, and for Other Pur-
 poses," S. Rept. 104-363 (Wash-
 ington, D.C.: Government Print-
 ing Office, 1996).
 41 CF-19-97.
 42 480 U.S. 202.
 43 102 Stat. 2475.
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 45 See, e.g., the 1996 Seminole case,
 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
 Tribal Government (1998), South
 Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe (1998),
 and Strate v. A- i Contractors.
 46 Heidi L. McNeil, "Indian Gaming:
 Prosperity and Controversy," in
 Malcolm Merrill, ed., American
 Indian Relationships in a Modern Ari-
 zona Economy, 65th Arizona Town
 Hall (Phoenix: Arizona Town
 Hall, 1994), 120.
 47 Loa M. Schell, comp. and ed.,
 1995-1996 Tribal Directory of the
 Twenty-One Federally Recognized
 Indian Tribes of Arizona (Phoenix:
 Arizona Commission of Indian
 Affairs).
 48 Eric Henderson and Scott Russell,
 "The Navajo Gaming Referendum:
 Reservations about Casinos Lead
 to Popular Rejection of Legalized
 Gambling," Human Organization 56,
 no. 3 (1997): 294-301. Much of
 this section derives from this ex-
 cellent article.
 49 Title 17, Section 421, Navajo
 Nation Code.
 50 Henderson and Russell, "The
 Navajo Gaming Referendum," 294.
 51 Ibid., 297.
 52 See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363
 (1930), and Squire v. Capoeman, 351
 U.S. 1(1956).
 53 Michael Benson, Sovereignty: The
 Navajo Nation and Taxation (Window
 Rock, Ariz.: DNA-People's Legal
 Services, 1976), 20.
 54 Ibid., 26.
 55 455 U.S. 130, 139(1982).
 56 105 S.Ct. 1900.
 57 See Robert W. Hanula, "The
 Navajo Tax System," Arizona Bar
 Journal (December-January 1988):
 6-9.
 58 Interview with Amy Alderman, an
 attorney for the Navajo Tax Com-
 mission, August 1, 1998.
 59 Ibid.
 60 Tom Tso, "Interview," Arizona
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